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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to §78-2-3(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue presented for decision is whether the limits of 
liability for underinsured motorist coverage in an automobile 
insurance policy is excess to the liability payment of a tort-
feasor or whether the liability coverage of the tort-feasor is to 
be subtracted from the limit of liability of the underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
The standard of review on this appeal from a summary judgment 
is that this court will view facts and inferences in light most 
favorable to the appellant and may freely substitute its judgment 
of the law for that of the district court. Utah State Coalition of 
Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632 (Utah 
1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellant claims there are no determinative Utah statutes 
applicable to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by an insurance 
company against its insureds for a determination of whether 
insurance coverage existed for a certain accident described below. 
The insureds countercl aimed asking the court to not only find that 
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coverage exists, but to also find that the limits of liability were 
excess to the liability coverage of the vehicle owner. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Complaint in this action was filed January 26, 1990 in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. Record, p. 2. 
The defendants answered and filed a Counterclaim on February 12, 
1990. Record, p. 11. On August 21, 1990, plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Record, p. 28. Defendants filed their own 
Motion for Summary Judgment on August 23, 1990. Record, p. 118. 
After appropriate memoranda were filed in support and in 
opposition to the respective motions, the court entered a Memoran-
dum Decision dated October 19, 1990. Record, p. 279. A formal 
Order Granting Defendants Summary Judgment was entered November 1, 
1990. Record, p. 292. Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal on 
November 28, 1990. Record, p. 303. 
C, Disposition at Trial Court 
As explained above, this action was resolved by granting the 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant has not 
appealed the district court's judgment that underinsurance coverage 
was in place for the accident at issue. The appeal is made from 
that portion of the summary judgment which found that the entire 
underinsurance coverage is available to the insured without 
deduction for payment made by the tort-feasor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of the following facts were submitted to the district 
court by USF&G in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
were undisputed by the defendants. Compare Record pp. 32 - 36 with 
Record p. 186. Those facts are: 
1. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is an insurance 
company regularly engaged in the business of writing automobile 
insurance in the state of Utah. 
2. Robert and Linda Sandt are husband and wife residing in 
Summit County, Utah. 
3. Sean Sandt is the son of Linda Sandt and a step-son of 
Robert Sandt. His date of birth is May 5, 1974. 
4. As of July 17, 1989, USF&G had issued an automobile 
insurance policy for Robert and Linda Sandt. 
5. The insurance policy at issue contained coverage known 
commonly as underinsured motorist coverage. 
6. Approximately three weeks prior to the night of July 16, 
1989, Dustin Sturges, then 13 years old, found a set of keys his 
mother had lost to her 1985 Toyota pick-up truck. He kept the keys 
without telling his mother he had found them. 
7. On the evening of July 16, 1989, Dustin Sturges, Sean 
Sandt, and another friend, Tony Holder, age 14, gathered together 
at the home of Dustin Sturges for a sleep over. They were joined 
later that evening by another friend, Elijah Molitar, age 13. 
8. After the adults in the home had gone to bed, the four 
boys, as established by deposition testimony, "snuck downstairs and 
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outside" to the pick-up truck parked in the driveway. With the 
lights off, all of the boys, including Sean Sandt, pushed the truck 
backwards out of the driveway and then down the street a few houses 
with the engine off. They then drove off using the keys found 
earlier. They did not have permission from the owner of the 
vehicle to use the truck nor were any of them of legal age to 
possess a Utah driver's license. 
9. The boys drove around the Park City area for approximate-
ly two hours when they were involved in an accident in which the 
truck rolled and Sean Sandt received substantial and, apparently, 
permanent injury. Medical costs are in excess of $400,000. 
10. The Sturges' vehicle involved in the accident was covered 
by an automobile liability policy issued by Farmer's Insurance 
Company. Farmer's paid its policy limit of $100,000 out of 
liability coverage for its insured for the benefit of Sean Sandt. 
Record pp. 70 - 71. 
11. Sean Sandt was paid $5,000 by Farmers in addition to the 
$100,000 under the Sturges' personal injury protection coverage. 
Record p. 71. 
12. The underinsurance coverage by USF&G for Robert and Linda 
Sandt on their own vehicle not involved in the accident was 
$300,000. Record p. 47. 
13. USF&G has paid $200,000 to the Sandts. Record p. 296. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
USF&G claims that the district court erred in finding that the 
entire $300,000 policy limit of underinsured motorist coverage is 
4 
in place for this accident. Instead, the plain language of the 
policy at issue makes clear that the $100,000 payment made by the 
insurer for the vehicle involved in the accident should be deducted 
from the policy limit so that the available coverage is $200,000 
instead of the $300,000 claimed and awarded by the district court. 
This conclusion is consistent with the plain language of the 
policy, consistent with public policy, and consistent with the 
recognized operation of underinsured motorist policies nationwide. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
As an examination of the entire record will reflect, the 
original thrust of the declaratory judgment action filed by USF&G 
was to ask the court to determine whether coverage existed under 
the circumstances of underage operators knowingly using the motor 
vehicle without permission of the owner. The district court found 
that coverage existed and a determination was made by USF&G to not 
challenge that ruling on appeal. However, the district court made 
substantial error in finding that the full $300,000 underinsured 
motorist coverage is excess to the $100,000 paid by the tort-
feasor's insurer. An examination of the court's Memorandum 
Opinion, at Record pp. 287 - 288, shows that this substantial issue 
was treated rather perfunctorily by the district court. The 
district court apparently failed to apply the usual rules of 
interpretation of insurance policies as explained more fully below. 
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B. Applicable Law 
Utah has well defined rules of interpretation of insurance 
policies and contracts which control resolution of the action here. 
Specifically, an insurance contract should be interpreted according 
to the plain meaning of its words unless ambiguity is found. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Commercial Union Assurance. 606 P.2d 
1206 (Utah 1980). As with other contracts, meaning may be obtained 
by examining the document as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1982). Ambiguity in a contract is said to exist where 
the words used to express meaning and intention of the parties are 
subject to reasonable interpretation in more than one way. C.J. 
Realty, Inc. v. Willeyr 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988). However, 
ambiguity is not found as the result of a mere disagreement of the 
parties arguing different interpretation. Instead, it is an 
objective review of the language in light of how it would be 
understood by an average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. 
Drauahon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989); 
Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Assoc. 589 P.2d 780 (Utah 1979). 
Finally, where ambiguity is found, interpretation should be 
construed against the insurer, but the ordinary meaning of the 
words used should still be given force. Fuller v. Director of 
Finance, 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985). 
C. The Policy at Issue 
The entire USF&G policy for the Sandts is contained in the 
record at pp. 45 - 68. For purposes of this appeal, only the 
underinsured motorist coverage provisions, contained in record pp. 
6 
5 8 - 6 0 , are at issue and attached as an exhibit to this Brief. 
Also attached as an exhibit for the courts information is a copy 
of the declaration page of the policy found in the record at p. 47. 
A reading of the underinsured motorist coverage in its 
entirety shows that the intent of the policy language is to pay an 
insured for bodily injury received from the negligence of one 
operating an underinsured motor vehicle. An underinsured motor 
vehicle is defined as a motor vehicle for which insurance coverage 
exists but "...its limit for bodily injury liability is less than 
the limit of liability for this coverage." 
The underinsurance coverage provides a specific limit of 
liability. The policy provides in relevant part: 
The limit of liability shown in the schedule [$300,000 
here] for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability 
for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is 
the most we will pay regardless of the number of:... 
...However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by 
all sums paid because of the bodily injury by or on 
behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible. This includes all sums paid under part A 
[liability coverage] of this policy. 
The decision of the district court put into issue the "other 
insurance" provision of the underinsurance coverage. That clause 
is as follows: 
If there is other applicable similar insurance, we will 
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the 
proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total 
of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be 
excess over any other collectable insurance. 
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Finally, the underinsurance coverage contains provisions 
relating to exclusions and arbitration which are not at issue in 
this appeal. 
D. The Plain Language of the Policy is Not Ambiguous 
If one applies the rules of determining whether ambiguity 
exists as recited above, it is apparent that the plain language of 
the underinsured motorist coverage is not ambiguous regarding the 
limit of liability. Reading the four corners of the coverage 
language, a reasonable person would readily understand the coverage 
being offered. The policy follows a logical procedure in explain-
ing that coverage is being extended for bodily injury incurred at 
the hand of an operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. The 
policy then defines an underinsured motor vehicle as one having 
limits of liability less than the limit of liability for the 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
The limit of liability language further explains that if the 
insured is able to collect for his injuries from other persons 
legally responsible for those injuries, such collection will serve 
to reduce the limit of liability. 
Put in the context of this case, the Sturges' vehicle had 
$100,000 of liability coverage. The Sandts, under the USF&G 
policy, had $300,000 of underinsured motorist coverage. Applying 
the language of the limit of liability, the $100,000 collected from 
the Sturges' insurer is subtracted from the $300,000 coverage 
limit. To hold anything else would be to read out of the underin-
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sured motorist coverage all of the language of the limit of 
liability and render it meaningless. 
This interpretation of the plain language of the policy is 
based upon the plain meaning of the words used, does not require 
the invoking of any new legal rule of interpretation or tortured 
construction of the words, and is consistent with the nature of the 
product purchased. The rules of interpretation require that 
insurance policies be considered in the light of a reasonable 
purchaser of insurance. Inherent in that rule of interpretation is 
the assumption that a reasonable person would have some awareness 
of the product of which they are purchasing. The very nature of 
underinsured motorist coverage is that one is purchasing a certain 
limit of coverage to guard against the tort-feasor that may not 
have the insurance coverage desired. See 8C Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, §5071.45 (1981). As explained in Hiagins v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 770 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1989), the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage is to place the injured party in the 
same position as to the recovery of damages that he would have had 
if the tort-feasor had possessed liability insurance in the amount 
of the underinsured policy limits. 
When one takes into account what underinsured motorist 
coverage is by nature, it is seen that appellees' claim that an 
offset should not be made for the $100,000 paid by Farmer's 
Insurance Company is analogous to one purchasing an automobile and 
then complaining that he did not know you had to put air in the 
tires. Some assumption should be made that a purchaser has a 
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reasonable knowledge of the fundamental nature of the product 
purchased. By definition, one who is purchasing underinsured 
motorist coverage is purchasing protection to a certain limit in 
case the tort-feasor has less coverage. Holding the coverage as 
excess is outside of the concept of uninsured motorist coverage and 
really constitutes a whole new kind of coverage more analogous to 
formal excess or umbrella type policies. The language contained in 
the policy is not unclear to any degree to justify creating a whole 
new basic concept of what underinsured motorist coverage is by 
nature. 
E. Reducing the Limit of Liability by the Tort-Feasor's 
Payment is Consistent with Public Policy. 
As this court will likely discover, Utah has no specific case 
law addressing underinsured motorist coverage. Unfortunately, Utah 
also does not have any statutes addressing underinsured motorist 
coverage. A reading of case law from other states shows that the 
case law is generally helpful in pointing out analysis and policy, 
but is admittedly not controlling as the cases are highly dependent 
upon statutes in other states. 
One statute that is instructive in making an analysis for Utah 
is §31A-22-305(6), Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. The 
entirety of §305 addresses uninsured motorist coverage. Uninsured 
motorist coverage is coverage purchased by an insured for protec-
tion against tort-feasors that carry no insurance. Underinsured 
motorist coverage is distinguishable for the obvious reason that 
the tort-feasor has some insurance at the time of the accident at 
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issue. Both coverages are very similar in their operation and 
other states frequently refer to underinsured coverage as a branch 
of uninsured motorist coverage. See, 2 Widiss, Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist Insurance, §31.4 (2d Ed.); Schmick v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092 (N.M. 1985). 
In §31A-22-305(6) the law provides: 
(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for 
uninsured motorist coverage for two or more motor 
vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an 
injured person for any one accident. 
This statutory provision makes clear that the public policy of 
Utah is to not stack or combine uninsured motorist coverage in such 
a way as to exceed the limit of liability for uninsured motorist 
coverage. This court may conclude that the coverages are of 
sufficient similarity that there is no compelling policy to treat 
underinsured coverage differently by combining or stacking 
coverages against legislative policy. Sge, Bates v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins.P 719 P.2d 171 (Wash. App. 1986). 
In construing a similar clause in an underinsured motorist 
coverage case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Idaho, like 
Utah, had no applicable underinsured motorist coverage statutes. 
The court held that usual non-insurance contract principles ought 
to have more weight in analyzing underinsurance questions than in 
the instance of uninsured motorist coverage where the legislature 
had declared public policies. Meckert v. TransAmerica Ins. Co.
 r 
701 P.2d 217 (Idaho 1985). The case is helpful here because it 
shows that in a similar legal context, this court may find that 
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there is no compelling policy in insurance or contract law to void 
the limit of liability language of the insurance policy. In fact, 
the Utah legislature has decided that exceeding or combining limits 
of liability in the analogous uninsured motorist coverage is not 
the public policy of this state. 
The position argued by USF&G here is not overreaching and is 
consistent with that taken by other courts. For example, in 
McAllaster v. Bruton, 655 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Me. 1987), the 
deduction of payment by the tort-feasor from underinsured motorist 
coverage was upheld. In Dilenno v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 632 
F. Supp. 1253 (D. Del. 1986), the court found no underinsurance 
coverage was available where the tort-feasor's liability coverage 
was equal to the underinsurance coverage of the injured person. An 
offset of the payment of a tort-feasor was upheld under another 
USF&G policy in Davidson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 336 
S.E.2d 709 (N.C. App. 1985) 
Still other states have upheld the offsetting of payments of 
the tort-feasor against underinsurance policy limits. Without 
reciting the facts of each, the court's attention is drawn to 
LaFrange v. United Services Auto. Assoc.r 700 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 
1985); Muller v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 627 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App. 
1981); Wert v. Picciano. 459 A.2d 697 (N.J. Super. 1982); and Mid-
Century Ins. Co. v. Daniel. 705 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1985). 
In summary, the very nature of underinsured motorist coverage 
is that the limits of liability of the tort-feasor's insurance 
policy will be offset against the underinsured motorist coverage 
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purchased. Utah has no particular law on the point, but a number 
of other states have upheld the offsetting of the coverage. By 
analogy, the Utah public policy against exceeding the limits of 
liability of uninsured motorist coverage is instructive that this 
court should follow the same policy with respect to underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
F. The "Other Insurance" Clause is Inapplicable 
Appellees argued at the district court level, and the district 
court accepted, that the underinsured motorist coverage provision 
entitled "Other Insurance" created an ambiguity in the policy 
because of the language to the effect that the underinsurance 
coverage "shall be excess over any other collectable insurance". 
This interpretation is patently incorrect and arises out of a 
combination of lack of understanding of what an "other insurance" 
clause is and how it is to work with respect to underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
Research reveals that there is no apparent controlling Utah 
case law or statutes and that there are very few cases in other 
jurisdictions which interpret an other insurance clause in the 
context of underinsured motorist coverage. Fortunately, some 
commentators have addressed the issue and the intended operation of 
that clause. 
In 2 Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, 
§40.1 gt seq. (2d Ed.), a comprehensive discussion of the operation 
of other insurance clauses in the context of underinsured coverage 
is given. Widiss sets out the exact language which is contained in 
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the USF&G policy here and then explains its meaning. As explained, 
the purpose of this clause is to address two situations. The first 
are those situations in which the policy provides a pro rata 
coverage and the second are those situations in which the policy 
provides excess coverage. 
Widiss explains that the phrase "other applicable similar 
insurance" is referring to other existing underinsured motorist 
coverage. For example, one may own more than one vehicle and have 
underinsured coverage with different companies for each of the 
vehicles. In that situation, the other insurance clause operates 
to prorate the payment to the insured between the two existing 
underinsured policies. Put in the context of this case, the clause 
would apply if the Sandts had two vehicles with underinsured 
coverage for each. A pro rata payment would be required. 
Addressing the second situation of when excess coverage is 
available under this clause, Widiss recognizes the danger of the 
exact error which the district court made in this case. As he 
explains at §40.1: 
The meaning of this aspect of the Other Insurance 
provision might be much less obvious were it to be viewed 
independently of the developments of the uninsured 
motorist coverage. However, when considered in the 
context established by the uninsured motorist coverage, 
the meaning intended for this provision is generally well 
understood by judges and lawyers, as well as by insurers. 
The objective of the provision is to have the underin-
sured motorist insurance of the policy in which this 
clause appears treated as excess coverage - over any 
other collectable underinsured motorist insurance - when 
an insured is injured while occupying a vehicle that is 
not owned by the named insured, the spouse of a named 
insured who lives in the same household, or any relative 
of the named insured who lives in the same household. 
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An example of excess coverage under the Widiss commentary is 
if the Sandts had available uninsured motorist coverage from Brand 
X insurance company and coverage from USF&G on their own vehicles 
and the accident was in the Sturges vehicle. Under that circum-
stance, USF&G would pay only after Brand X had paid. 
Obviously, the controlling language of the other insurance 
clause is the phrase "other applicable similar insurance". The 
interpretation of Widiss that other applicable similar insurance 
means other underinsured coverage is supported by that case law 
which has addressed the question. In Polenz v. Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co. of Neb.. 419 N.W.2d 677 (Neb. 1988), the court wrestled with 
the interpretation of the words "other applicable similar insur-
ance". The court recognized that one could argue that the phrase 
referred generally to other existing insurance, but held that in 
the context of underinsurance the more reasonable interpretation of 
the phrase was that it meant other existing underinsured coverage. 
CJf. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Globe Am. Casualty Co.. 426 
N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1988); Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. , 
419 A.2d 105 (Pa. Super. 1980). 
The effect of the district court decision is to read out the 
word "similar" from the other insurance clause. Also, the 
reasoning glosses over the meaning of the phrase "excess over any 
other collectible insurance". This phrase is written in the 
context of an insurer addressing its insured and whether its 
insured collects other insurance. The payment by Farmer's for 
Sturges under the liability portion of the Sturges' policy is not 
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an insurance payment from the perspective of the Sandts. The 
Sandts are not insureds under the liability portion of another's 
automobile policy. Instead, the $100,000 paid is the settlement of 
a liability claim between the Sandts and the Sturges which the 
insurer for the Sturges pays for the Sturges. 
This point is demonstrated by the personal injury protection 
coverage paid by Farmer's for Sean Sandt. Farmer's paid the $5,000 
PIP benefit and Sean Sandt is an insured under the PIP provisions 
as a passenger in the Sturges vehicle. USF&G does not claim that 
it is entitled to an offset against the underinsured motorist 
coverage limit of liability for payment of the PIP benefit. 
In summary, the district court erred in finding that the 
underinsured motorist coverage was excess because it ignored the 
total context of the other insurance clause. The Memorandum 
Opinion of the district court is contrary to the operation of the 
other insurance clause described by the recognized commentators in 
the area and fails to fit with the reality of the legal relation-
ships. Because there is no other applicable similar insurance 
involved in this accident, the other insurance clause does not come 
into play. It would only come into play if the Sandts had other 
underinsured motorist coverage on another vehicle they owned or if 
there were other policies which directly insured Sean Sandt. 
CONCLUSION 
This Brief has shown that the district court erred in 
concluding that $300,000 of underinsured motorist coverage is 
available. The plain language of the policy and the very nature of 
16 
underinsured motorist coverage dictates the $100,000 paid by the 
vehicle owner through her insurer should be subtracted from the 
$300,000 policy limit of USF&G for a $200,000 limit of coverage. 
This approach is consistent with the general operation nationwide 
of underinsured motorist coverage. The district court further erred 
in applying its interpretation of the other insurance clause as it 
is not applicable to the circumstances because there was no other 
applicable similar insurance involved. 
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the district 
court by holding USF&G has no further obligation to the appellees 
under the policy at issue. 
DATED this /*/*" day of May, 1991. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY tT.7SANDERS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage Policy at Issue 
.A 
'^1^1979 
i 
& 
UNDERINSURED 
MOTORISTS 
COVERAGE 
Limit of Liability 
SCHEDULE 
Autol 
Premium 
Auto 2 
PP03 11 
(Ed. 6-80) 
Auto 3 
each accident $ $ 
We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by a covered person; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle. 
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily 
injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settle-
ments. 
"Covered person" as used in this endorsement means: 
1. You or any family member. 
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto. 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury 
to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above. 
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which 
a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but its limit for 
bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this coverage. 
However, "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include any vehicle or equipment: 
1. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident 
but its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit for bodily injury 
liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which your covered 
auto is principally garaged. 
2. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency. 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads. 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not upon public roads. 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises. 
7. Owned or operated by a person qualifying as a self-insurer under any applicable 
motor vehicle law. 
8. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident 
but the bonding or insuring company: 
a. denies coverage; or 
b. is or becomes insolvent. 
EXCLUSIONS 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any 
person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family 
member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer 
of any type used with that vehicle. 
2. While occupying your covered auto when it is being used to carry persons or proper-
ty for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool. 
3. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. 
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer or self-insurer 
under any of the following or similar law: 
1. workers* compensation law; or 
2. disability benefits law. 
PP03 11 (Ed. 6-80) 
©'•W'' 1979 
PP03 11 
(Ed. 6-80) 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY ~ ~ 
The limit of liability shown in the Schedule for this coverage Is our maximum limit of 
liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons; 
2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the bodily injury 
by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes 
all sums paid under Part A of this policy. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all 
sums paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar 
law: 
1. workers' compensation law; or 
2. disability benefits law. 
Any payment under this coverage will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover 
under Part A of this policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible insurance. 
ARBITRATION 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement; 
or 
2. As to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select 
an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, 
either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each 
party will: 
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and 
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally. 
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the 
covered person lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision 
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding as to: 
1. Whether the covered person is legally entitled to recover damages; and 
2. The amount of damages. This applies only if the amount does not exceed the mini-
mum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the 
state in which your covered auto is principally garaged. If the amount exceeds that limit, 
either party may demand the right to a trial. This demand must be made within 60 days 
of the arbitrators1 decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed 
to by the arbitrators will be binding. 
ADDITIONAL DUTY 
Any person seeking coverage under this endorsement must also promptly send us copies 
of the legal papers if a suit is brought. 
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is written. 
r 
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
COVERAGE EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT 
PP 04 05 01 88 
The following exclusion is added to Uninsured Motorists Coverage and, where afforded, 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage: 
We do not provide coverage for punitive or exemplary damages. 
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is 
written. 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
Declaration Page of Policy 
I U E S T COMPETITIVE PERSONAL AUTO POtTCY 
DECLARATIONS PAGE 
CHANGES TO THIS INFO ON REVERSE SIDE - SECTION III 
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ATTACHMENT WCB 
§31A-22-305, Utah Code Anno,. 1953, as amended 
31A-22-305. Uninsured motorist coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or 
owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered 
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or if 
the vehicle is covered, but with lower limits than required by Section 
31A-22-304, then the motor vehicle is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle which left the scene of an accident 
proximately caused by its operator; or 
(c) an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability 
insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, but the motor vehicle is uninsured only to the extent that the 
claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association 
or fund. 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) pro-
vides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death, in limits which at least equal the minimum bodily 
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer 
that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). This 
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the in-
sured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability 
insurer. 
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, which are engaged in 
the business of, or which accept payment for, transporting natural per-
sons by motor vehicle, and all school districts which provide transporta-
tion services for its students, shall provide for all vehicles used for that 
purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, unin-
sured motorist coverage of at least $20,000 per person and $500,000 per 
accident. This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an 
iryured occupant, and does not apply to an employee who is injured by an 
uninsured motorist whose exclusive remedy is provided by Chapter 1, 
Title 35. 
(c) As used in this subsection: 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 
63-30-2; and 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-1-1. 
(5) When a covered person claims an uninsured motor vehicle under Sub-
section (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, then the covered person 
shall show the existence of the other motor vehicle by clear and convincing 
evidence, which shall consist of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage 
for two or more motor vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for 
any one accident. If uninsured motorist coverage is available to an injured 
person under more than one insurance policy, the iiyured person shall elect 
the policy under which he desires to collect uninsured motorist benefits. 
Claimants are not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is 
unavflilflhlp lin/tar nrpvinno o1a/«tiAnc 
ATTACHMENT "D" 
Memorandum Decision of the Third District Court 
FILED ffiSTIUOraUBT 
Third Judicial District 
CT 1 9 1990 
O^uiy Cleric 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
ROBERT SANDT, LINDA SANDT 
and SEAN SANDT, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 7 
I. STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS 
On .July 1G, H989 Robert: and Linda Sandt had automobile 
insurance with the United States Fidelity IS, Guaranty Company 
(USJK&G) which had an 1 mderinsured motorist policy limit of 
$3 00,000.00 per person or accident. On the night of J n 1] y 16, 
1 ' 1 : ia Sc .1 1 i l l iiiinn II 
stepson of Robert Sandt—was staying : 1riend, 
Dustin Sturge^ •« *< Ton older, age 14, and • ^ ah 
Ilk 
City, Utah. Alsc » home at the time v*, Pamela Sturges, 
mother 01 Dustii i and owner :: f t .1 £ > M E .1 1 :ii :::] e 
accident a+- issue, a boarder , ai id ai 1 adu] t relative of Mrs. 
Sturges. 
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After the adults had gone to bed, the four boys (Sean, 
Dustin, Tony and Elijah) pushed Pamela Sturges' truck backwards 
out of the driveway and then down the street a few houses with 
the engine off. Pamela Sturges had not given permission for 
any of the boys to use the truck., The boys proceeded to drive 
around the Park City area over the next approximately two 
hours—Tony Holder was the sole driver. During this time, the 
boys stopped to pick up three girls of approximately the same 
age as the boys. 
Tony Holder, apparently with the intent to scare the girls 
in the back of the pickup, started driving fast which resulted 
in the accident at issue wherein the truck rolled at least 
once. Sean Sandt, who was in the back of the pickup when the 
truck rolled, was thrown out striking his head. The pickup 
rolled over and ended upright with the left rear tire resting 
on Sean's chest. Sean Sandt sustained a severe brain injury 
and remains comatose to this date. In a persistent vegetative 
state where he neither communicates nor moves, Sean is totally 
disabled and will need lifelong medical and nursing care. His 
parents, Robert and Linda Sandt, assert that his medical bills 
are, or will shortly be, well in excess of $400,000.00. 
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While the Sandts have received the policy 1imit of 
$100,000.00 from Pamela Sturges' automobile liability insurer, 
they ha ye made a cl aim against USFU, I urn t ho linn \\v i uir 
underinsured motorist coverage under their automobile policy. 
USF&G has * 
po] icy ai id 1 las I ileu .is action seeking declaratory relief. 
Both *! plaintiff and defendants have made motions summary 
i t • * . 
II. ISSUE 
Whether Sean Sandt is excluded under exclusion A-3 the 
Compar. w or whether 
such exclusion ambiguous and should therefore be construed 
in idvui ui tut insured. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The exclusion undersigned motorist section of the 
I* m j II 1 1 " ill mi mi Il iiiiiv" 11111 i n v e i . i n | t " s i d I H S : 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorist's 
Co ~age for bodily injury sustained by any person: 
, While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not 
insured for this coverage under this policy. This 
includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle. 
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2. While occupying your covered auto when it is 
being used to carry persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
car pool. 
3. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief 
that that person is entitled to do so. 
Plaintiff, USF&G, asserts that the contract language is 
clear and that Sean Sandt was using the Sturges vehicle without 
a reasonable belief that he was entitled to and therefore 
should be excluded from coverage. Defendants, of course, 
assert that the contract should be construed in favor of 
finding coverage for Sean because the language of the contract 
in general, and more specifically the language of the 
exclusion, is ambiguous. 
The interpretation of a written contract may be a 
question of law determined by the words in the 
agreement. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P. 2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). In this regard^ we recently 
stated that a cardinal rule in construing the contract 
is to give effect to the intentions of the parties and, 
if possible, these intentions should be gleaned from an 
examination of the text of the contract itself. Id. 
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857,858 
(Utah 1988). 
The court went on to state that it has long subscribed to the 
view that "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an 
insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. As 
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« i i CdJIiJ .. V"•. . Deseret Mutual Benefit Association ""»B 9 
P.2d 780 (Utah 1979) stated, "A term is not necessarily 
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow it with a 
Ill :llt 
7 82. The court then reiterated that test for ambiguity as 
originally defined :i n Ai ito Lease jCo , j/_. Central Mut, 1 n s , Co, , 
ah 2 1 ,„, 325 P 2d 264 266 (1958). 
The test * applied is: would the meaning be plain 
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance 
with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in 
the light of existing circumstances, including the 
purpose of the policy. If so, the special rule [that 
ambiguities are construed against the drafter] of 
construction is obviously unnecessary. 
Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Association \ \ ?. 
This test i s sti ] 1 the rule in Utah as indicated by the court 
in LPS Hosp» Capitol. Life Ins. Co. 858-59 and iJLI±iy e Ii if i 
Apartments v. State Farm, 790 P.2d 5 l (Utah App, 1990) 
By using language w h i ^ clearl and unmistakably 
communicates i i i ruins' :jnr" " IIIHUT 
which the expected coverage \* orovided" insurer 
may exclude certain losses rom coverage Village Inn 
Apartments v State Farm, contract language, 
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however, may be ambiguous if it is "unclear, omits terms, 
(cite omitted) or if the terms used to express the intention of 
the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings," Id, at 583. (Emphasis added.) 
In the present action, defendants argue that the word 
"using" in the exclusion provision at issue is meant to apply 
to drivers versus the work "occupying" referring to drivers of 
passengers, thereby providing—on its face—for coverage for 
Sean. Plaintiff, citing Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co. , 780 P2d 
278 (Wash. App. 1989) , counters with the argument that the 
definition of "using a vehicle" in insurance policies is 
traditionally quite broad and arises whenever there is a causal 
relation between the injury and the use of an insured vehicle. 
The court in Roller [citing Sears v. Grange Ins. Assoc., 111 
Wash.2d 636, 762 P.2d 1141 (1988) — an earlier Washington 
Supreme Court case] did state four essential criteria to be 
used in determining whether a person is "using a vehicle." 
The four criteria are: (1) there must be a causal 
relation or connection between the injury and the use 
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of the insured vehicle:
 %_) the person asserting 
coverage must be in a reasonably close physical 
proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person 
need not be actually touching it; (3) the person must 
be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk 
oriented at the time; and (4) the person must also be 
engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the 
vehicle at the ti me 
Roller v, Stonewall Ins, Co, , a t: 28 0, 
According Washington Supreme Court, the "weight" of 
I ill mi in ( I in i t i i i n ••. in in ( 1 1 M I I 1 s II In I mi 1 1 ) mi i i 
that passengers are users -. motor vehicle Sears v. Grange 
Ins. Assoc, , 111 Wash However i 
coverage .njured party, not to prevent coverage by of. 
~^ exclusion olicy. 
I n iliII in I in i H I I I lliKu i in a r g u m e r i l I I I I I i I <->rm " U J . i IK;J • i r i o t 
defined 1} the policy and therefore ambiguous, the defendants 
raise two other area,! i 
that approximately half
 :&t=> dealing with the same 
exclusion nationwide < >olicy language was held ambiguous 
1 n a s e i II li II hi t <• in | be! " 
Second, :iting, Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kubik, 4 92 
1I.E.2d 504 {..^. 1986), defendants argue that the terms 
r.rt-.o 
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"family member" and "any person" are used throughout the policy 
exclusions in such a way as to create the impression that they 
constitute two mutually exclusive classes of insureds. 
Therefore, defendants claim there is an ambiguity as to whether 
the exclusion at issue was intended to exclude Sean as a family 
member and that the exclusion might be read to apply to every 
individual using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that 
he or she was entitled to do so, except for a family member. 
The court in Economy Fire stressed that the "ambiguity in 
Economy's policy stems not from the language in and of itself, 
but rather from the manner in which that language is employed 
throughout the policy." Economy Fire at 508. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the defendants raise several points which are 
subject to different interpretation, the exclusion language 
fits into the category of language which fails to unmistakably 
communicate its meaning. Therefore, the policy exclusion at 
issue is found to be ambiguous and thereby construed in favor 
of finding coverage for Sean Sandt. 
V. ISSUE 
Whether, if coverage is found to exist for Sean Sandt, 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company should be allowed 
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offset 
VI, ANALYSIS 
As aitial question concerning * - interpretation of 
defendants have 
presented their interpretations *!Other Insurance" 
clause, the text of which follows: 
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will 
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the 
proportion that our limit of liability bears to the 
total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance 
we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own 
shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
The 
insurance" and similar insurance" are defined >i the 
policy, the most logica nterpretation * - *• ^ • * 
. w ; ^ co. t, by 
the Sandts. They go t.r« *:> i visions taken 
together herefore mean tha 
-'. /insured motorist coverage where the Sandts7 
vehicle is involved in I he accident. However, with respect to 
a vehiu, i1"1 t I'll1' i If i mi I ! v 
*->^ $700,000 underinsured coverage "shall be excess over other 
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collectible insurance," This appears to be a fair and 
reasonable interpretation of the policy. 
The plaintiff, however, argues that the provision at issue 
is meant to be read as "excess over any other payment of 
insurance from any source of underinsured motorist coverage." 
They argue that to accept the defendants' interpretation would 
be to give umbrella coverage for accidents involving a vehicle 
not owned by the insured. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In light of the two interpretations indicating that the 
provision may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings, this clause too is ambiguous, thereby requiring that 
it "be resolved in favor of coverage." LPS Hospital v. Capitol 
Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
COURT RULING 
Because of various provisions of the USF&G policy issued to 
the Sandts which are subject to more than one fair and 
reasonable interpretation, the policy provisions at issue 
should be found to be ambiguous. Therefore, such provisions 
should be construed against the drafter (USF&G) and in favor of 
coverage. 
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Plaintiff's Motion f-.- ummary Judgment therefore is 
I 111 1 I | l « ( I 1 )4-1 J <• I I I l i l I! I l l 
Defendants t o prepare pleadings pursuant to this Memorandum 
Decision. 
Dated this_ _/J_daj < » I: Octobei , i M*M.) , 
RAYMOND S. UNO v 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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